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Fraud, Abuse, and Opioids
By Stacey A. Tovino, JD, PhD *
I. INTRODUCTION
Legislation, regulation, scholarship, and journalism addressing the
opioid crisis has focused on a number of front-end management strategies,
including opioid production quotas,' opioid taxes,2 drug labeling,3 risk
evaluation and mitigation strategies, 4  marketing restrictions, opioid
* Judge Jack and Lulu Lehman Professor of Law and Founding Director, Health Law Program,
William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I thank Lena Rieke, Law Library
Fellow, Wiener-Rogers Law Library, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas, for her outstanding research assistance and the Kansas Law Review for the invitation to
participate in this symposium.
1. See Scott Burris et al., Stopping an Invisible Epidemic: Legal Issues in the Provision of
Naloxone to Prevent Opioid Overdose, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 273, 286 (2009) (discussing production
quotas as well as eradication programs, border controls, and street-level disruptions as supply-side
interventions that can help interfere with the production and distribution of opioids and other drugs).
2. See, e.g., Editorial, Kill Cuomo's Cockamamie 'Opioid Tax', N.Y. POST (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://nypost.com/2018/03/22/kill-cuomos-cockamamie-opioid-tax/ [https://perma.cc/U2HH-L58C]
(criticizing Governor Andrew Cuomo's proposed two-cents-per-milligram opioid tax, also known as
an "opioid epidemic surcharge" and questioning whether pharmaceutical companies would actually
pay the tax).
3. Patricia J. Zettler, Margaret Foster Riley & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Implementing a Public
Health Perspective in FDA Drug Regulation, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 221, 247-55 (2018) (discussing
the FDA's influence of provider and patient behavior through drug labeling).
4. Hilary Homenko, Rehabilitating Opioid Regulation: A Prescription for the FDA's Next
Proposal of an Opioid Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), 22 HEALTH MATRIX 273,
290-312 (2012) (discussing the FDA's authority to require a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy
(REMS) as part of a drug approval application; applying REMS to the opioid crisis).
5. See, e.g., Ameet Sarpatwari, Michael S. Sinha & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The Opioid
Epidemic: Fixing a Broken Pharmaceutical Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 463, 472-73 (2017)
(arguing that ineffective penalties for illegal marketing incentivized opioid manufacturers to make
misleading claims).
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insurance coverage limitations,6 physician prescribing practices,
prescription drug monitoring programs,8 prescription safety alert systems, 9
maximum initial opioid prescription quantities, 0 continuing opioid
education for opioid prescribers," and temporary restraining orders for
improper opioid prescribers.1 2  Back-end crisis-management strategies,
6. See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, State Benchmark Plan Coverage of Opioid Use Disorder
Treatments andServices: Trends andLimitations, 70 S.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (surveying state
benchmark plan coverage of opioid use disorder treatments and services and identifying trends and
limitations relevant thereto); Lev Facher, Tapered to Zero: In Radical Move, Oregon's Medicaid
Program Weighs Cutting Off Chronic Pain Patients from Opioids, STAT (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.statnews.com/2018/08/15/oregon-medicaid-tapering-opioids/ [https://perma.cc/MQL2-
QN6N] (reporting Oregon officials' consideration of a proposal that would end Medicaid coverage of
opioids for Medicaid beneficiaries with chronic pain); Brett Kelman, Blue Cross Will Stop Covering
OxyContin in Tennessee Next Year, TENNESSEAN (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.tennessean.com/
story/news/health/2018/09/06/blue-cross-stop-covering-oxycontin-tennessee-opioid-epidemic/ 11099
15002/ [https://perma.cc/B2QX-XARG] ("The largest health insurance company in Tennessee will
stop covering OxyContin prescriptions next year as part of sweeping policy changes intended to
combat opioid addiction and make pain pills less valuable on the black market.").
7. See generally Kelly K. Dineen, Definitions Matter: Defining Inappropriate Prescribing to
Shape Effective Opioid Policy and Reduce Patient Harm, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. _ (2019) (assessing
opioid prescribing policy and the lack of definitions for inappropriate prescribing; offering a new
framework for inappropriate prescribing); Kelly K. Dineen & James M. Dubois, Between a Rock and
a Hard Place: Can Physicians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal
Sanction?, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2016) (reviewing cases of inappropriate prescribing and suggesting
a new framework for describing and categorizing inappropriate prescribers); Kelly K. Dineen,
Addressing Prescription Opioid Abuse Concerns in Context: Synchronizing Policy Solutions to
Multiple Complex Public Health Problems, 40 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (2016) (examining prescription
opioid policy in light of available morbidity and mortality data and suggesting areas of policy priority
that better align with evidence).
8. See, e.g., Jennifer Oliva, Prescription Drug Policing: The Right to Protected Health
Information Privacy Pre- and Post-Carpenter, 69 DUKE L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that
courts are more likely to rule that warrantless Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) searches of sensitive
health care data stored in prescription drug monitoring program (PDMP) databases violate the Fourth
Amendment post-Carpenter v. United States).
9. See, e.g., Jessica Davis, Nationwide Prescription Safety Alert System Proposed by House
Bill, HEATHCARE IT NEWS, (Aug. 31, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/
news/nationwide-prescription-safety-alert-system-proposed-house-bill [https://perma.cc/5UHR-
HW6M] (discussing House Representatives Tom MacArthur, Barbara Comstock, and Ann Kuster's
introduction of new legislation to create a nationwide Prescription Safety Alert System to help prevent
patient opioid abuse).
10. An Act Relating to Regulation of Opioid Drugs, OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 2-3091 (Westlaw
though 2018 Legis. Sess.) (prohibiting practitioners from issuing an initial prescription for an opioid
drug in a quantity exceeding a seven-day supply for treatment of acute pain in an adult patient or a
patient under the age of eighteen; further requiring any opioid prescription for acute pain to be for the
lowest effective dose of the immediate-release version of the opioid drug).
11. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 161.10a (Westlaw though 2018 Legis. Sess.) (requiring Oklahoma
licensed physicians who have DEA numbers to take at least one hour of continuing education in the
area of pain management or opioid addiction prior to license renewal).
12. See Alex Ebert, DOJ Restraining Orders Strip Docs' Opioid Prescribing Rights,
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (last updated Aug. 22, 2018, 3:17 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
document/X3SFRFPCO00000?bnanewsfilter-health-law-and-business&jcsearch=BNA%/o2520000
0016562c8d309a5757aeef3520002#jcite [http://perma.cc/U3DG-WPFW] (reporting that the U.S.
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including needle exchange programs,1 3 safe injection sites,'4 naloxone
availability," medication-assisted treatment,' 6 mobile health care
services," national recovery housing best practices, 18 integrated treatment
for individuals with co-occurring mental disorders,1 9 information sharing
with families and caregivers during opioid overdoses,20 insurance
coverage of opioid addiction and overdose treatments,2' opioid treatment
insurance parity, 22 and even sharply-written letters by medical examiners
Department of Justice (DOJ) is using civil temporary restraining orders to prevent physicians from
writing improper opioid prescriptions while under investigation for illegal conduct; also reporting that
the DOJ used the emergency orders against two Ohio physicians who were allegedly caught giving
opioids to undercover patients who did not need the opioids).
13. See Melissa Vallejo, Safer Bathrooms in Syringe Exchange Programs: Injecting Progress
into the Harm Reduction Movement, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1185, 1211-24 (2018) (advocating for safe
bathrooms as part of syringe exchange programs).
14. See, e.g., Alex H. Kral & Peter J. Davidson, Addressing the Nation's Opioid Epidemic:
Lessons from an Unsanctioned Supervised Injection Site in the U.S., 53 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 919,
919-21 (2017) (defining safe injection sites as "legally sanctioned locations that provide a hygienic
space for people to inject pre-obtained drugs while observed by trained staff'; noting that such sites
have the dual aims of increasing the safety of individuals who inject drugs and reducing the public
nuisance associated with public injection).
15. Corey S. Davis & Derek H. Carr, The Law and Policy of Opioidsfor Pain Management,
Addiction Treatment, and Overdose Reversal, 14 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 26-37 (2017) (examining
naloxone access).
16. See, e.g., Page M. Smith, Implementing Medicaid Health Homes to Provide Medication
Assisted Treatment to Opioid Dependent Medicaid Beneficiaries, 106 KY. L.J. 111, 123-43 (2017-
2018) (assessing the application of the Medicaid health home model in terms of delivering medication
assisted treatment to Medicaid recipients).
17. See, e.g., Jacob Dawson, Public Gives Input on Federal Grant to Combat Opioids in N.H.,
CONCORD MONITOR (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.concordmonitor.com/Public-gives-input-to-
DHHS-about-opioid-grant-funds-19451667 [https://perma.cc/V32X-ACWH?type=image] (reporting
public input regarding the opioid crisis; noting public desire for better mobile services).
18. SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 7031, 132 Stat. 3894
(2018) (requiring the Secretary of the federal Department of Health and Human Services (Secretary),
in consultation with other individuals and entities, to identify or facilitate the development of best
practices, which may include model laws for implementing suggested minimum standards for recovery
housing).
19. See, e.g., Allison Petersen et al., State Legislative Responses to the Opioid Crisis: Leading
Examples, 11 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCL L. 30,66 (2018) (discussing targeted case management, including
insurance coverage thereof, for patients with co-occurring mental health and substance use disorders,
including opioid use disorder).
20. SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act § 7052 (requiring the Secretary to annually
notify health care providers regarding permitted disclosures under federal health privacy laws during
emergencies, including opioid overdoses, of certain health information to families, caregivers, and
health care providers).
21. See, e.g., Sara Hansard, Health Insurer Uses Prevention, Therapy to Fight Opioid Crisis,
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Aug. 10, 2018, 1:17 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/
XDE7AN4K000000?bnanewsfilter-health-law-and-business&jcsearch=BNA%2520000001651f4
8d5faaf759f5cacde0002#jcite [https://perma.cc/5JFV-5FMV] (noting that Philadelphia-based
Independence Blue Cross ended prior authorization requirements for insurance coverage of opioid use
disorder treatments and made lifesaving drugs available for insureds who had overdosed on opioids).
22. SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act § 5021 (requiring mental health and substance
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to prescribing physicians following a patient's death due to overdose23
have also received significant attention. Less attention has been paid,
however, to the role of health care fraud and abuse authorities in
combating the opioid crisis. This Article helps to fill this gap in the
literature by analyzing recent government enforcement actions involving
two health care fraud and abuse authorities, including the federal Anti-
Kickback Statute and the federal civil False Claims Act, in cases involving
opioids. 4
Part II of this Article examines recent government enforcement
actions involving the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, which prohibits
(among other conduct) the exchange of remuneration for opioid
prescriptions, patient referrals for drug testing services, and patient
referrals for addiction treatment services if such prescriptions or services
are reimbursed in whole or in part by a federal health care program.2 5 Part
III of this Article examines recent government enforcement actions
involving the federal civil False Claims Act, which prohibits (among other
conduct) factually and legally false opioid prescription claims, drug testing
use disorder coverage under the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) to be provided at parity
with physical health coverage).
23. See, e.g., Margot Sanger-Katz, Here's a Cheap Way to Fight Drug Misuse: Send Doctors a
Sharp Letter, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/upshot/letters-to-
doctors-opioid-research.html [https://perma.cc/T97N-ZVTU] ("Two studies find that nudges
[sharply-written letters to prescribing physicians following a patient's death from opioids] can lead to
more scrupulous prescribing.").
24. Beyond the scope of this limited symposium Article are cases involving violations of federal
and state laws other than the federal Anti-Kickback Statute and the federal civil False Claims Act.
See, e.g., Leslie A. Pappas, Pharmacy's Sloppy Record Keeping Results in $100K Fine, BLOOMBERG
L. NEWS (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XAQPGJ04000000?
bnanewsfilter-health-law-and-business&jcsearch=BNA%/o2520000001651ff7dfa0a5ed7ff7fEfc000
0#jcite [https://perma.cc/H9WL-ME92] (reporting that AccuServ Pharmacy and its owner, pharmacist
Marvin P. Sheffler, agreed to pay $100,000 in civil penalties to resolve allegations that it failed to
properly keep track of prescription opioids and other addictive drugs in accordance with the Controlled
Substances Act, which establishes strict record-keeping requirements applicable to addictive
prescription medications); Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018, in the SUPPORT for
Patients and Communities Act § 8121 (making illegal the knowing and willful solicitation or receipt,
or offer or payment, of remuneration, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind, in
return for the referral of a patient or patronage to a recovery home, clinical treatment facility, or
laboratory or to induce a referral of an individual to a recovery home, clinical treatment facility, or
laboratory for which payment may be made under any public or private health care benefit program;
establishing criminal penalties of not more than $200,000, imprisonment of not more than ten years,
or both, for each such occurrence); 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a) (2012) (making illegal the knowing and willful
execution of, or attempt to execute, a scheme or artifice designed to: (1) "defraud any [public or
private] health care benefit program;" or (2) obtain, by "false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises, any of the money owned by or under the custody or control of any public or private health
care benefit program"; establishing criminal penalties for violations thereof, including fines and
imprisonment).
25. Infra Part II.
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claims, and addiction treatment claims when such claims are submitted for
payment to a federal health care program.26 Finally, Part IV addresses the
role of the Anti-Kickback Statute and the False Claims Act in combating
the opioid crisis and highlights new government initiatives in this area,
including: (1) the Prescription Interdiction & Litigation Task Force,
created by the Department of Justice in February 2018; (2) the Eliminating
Kickbacks in Recovery Act, signed into law by President Trump in
October 2018; and (3) a mega anti-fraud program known as the Unified
Program Integrity Contractor, announced by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services in November 2018.27
II. THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
A. Background
The federal Anti-Kickback Statute, also known as the Illegal
Remuneration Statute, prohibits the knowing and willful solicitation,
receipt, offer, or payment of any remuneration (including any kickback,
bribe, or rebate), directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind, in return for the referral of any individual for the furnishing of any
item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under
a federal health care program,28 such as Medicare,2 9 Medicaid,30 and
Tricare.3' The Anti-Kickback Statute also prohibits remuneration
knowingly and willfully exchanged in return for "purchasing, leasing,
26. Infra Part III.
27. Infra Part IV.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A) (2012) (limiting the application of the Anti-
Kickback Statute to federal health care program business).
29. Medicare is federally administered insurance program that Americans pay into throughout
their working lives and enroll in after they retire or acquire a disability. Medicare provides "basic
protection against the costs of hospital, related post-hospital, home health services, and hospice care"
for individuals who are age sixty-five or over; individuals under age 65 who have been entitled for not
less than twenty-four months to Social Security Disability Insurance benefits; and certain individuals
who have end stage renal disease. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395111 (2012 & Supp. 2017) (governing
Medicare).
30. Medicaid is a joint federal and state program that, together with the Children's Health
Insurance Program, provides health insurance coverage to over 72.5 million Americans, including low
income families, qualified pregnant women and children, and individuals receiving Supplemental
Security Income (SSI). States may choose to cover other individuals, such as individuals receiving
home and community-based services and children in foster care who are not otherwise eligible for
Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396w-5 (2012 & Supp. 2017) (governing Medicaid).
31. Tricare (formerly known as CHAMPUS) is a health insurance program carried out by the
U.S. Department of Defense that furnishes medical and dental care to members and veterans of the
armed forces as well as their family members. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1110 (2012 & Supp. 2017)
(governing Tricare).
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ordering or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good,
facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in
part under a federal health care program."32
The Anti-Kickback Statute is premised on the concern that health care
kickbacks can lead to corruption of medical decision making; patient
steering; overutilization of health care items, services, and supplies;
increased costs to federal health care programs; and unfair competition.33
A violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute is punishable as a felony.
Individuals convicted of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute shall be fined
not more than $100,000, imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both. 4
A prosecutor is not required to prove a defendant's actual knowledge of,
or specific intent to violate, the Anti-Kickback Statute in order to
successfully prosecute the defendant.35 A violation of the Anti-Kickback
Statute can also subject a defendant to exclusion from participation in
federal health care programs as well as civil monetary penalties.3 6
Over time, federal courts have interpreted key provisions within the
Anti-Kickback Statute.37 In 1985, for example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit established the "one purpose" rule in the case
of United States v. Greber.38 Greber involved a cardiologist (Defendant)
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B) (2012).
33. A Roadmap for New Physicians: Fraud and Abuse Laws, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/index.asp
[https://perma.cc/25W7-7H6L] (last visited Mar. 18, 2019) (listing concerns raised by health care
kickbacks).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1), (2) (as amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115-123, § 50412(a), (b), 132 Stat. 64 (Feb. 9,2018) (increasing the fines and sentences applicable
to violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute)).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h) ("With respect to violations of this section, a person need not have
actual knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this section.").
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (authorizing the Secretary of HHS to exclude any individual from
federal health care programs if the individual violates the Anti-Kickback Statute); id. § 1320a-7a(a)(7)
(stating that any individual who violates the Anti-Kickback Statute shall, in addition to any other
penalties that may be imposed, be subject to civil money penalties).
37. See United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a judge's
admonition to the jury that the jury could convict defendant for receipt of kickbacks in exchange for
referral of Medicare payments, "unless it found payment 'wholly and not incidentally attributable to
delivery of goods or services,"' was accurate); United States v. Borrasi, 639 F.3d 774, 782 (7th Cir.
2011) (ruling that the portion of payments received by the defendant that compensated him for his past
referrals or induced future referrals for health care services paid for by Medicare violated the Anti-
Kickback Statute: "Nothing in the Medicare fraud statute implies that only the primary motivation of
remuneration is to be considered in assessing [the defendant's] conduct. We join our sister circuits in
holding that if part of the payment compensated past referrals or induced future referrals, that portion
of the payment violates [the Anti-Kickback Statute]"); United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094
(5th Cir. 1998) (affirming trial court's decision to deny a requested instruction that the jury may find
the defendant guilty of conspiracy only if it finds that the defendant's cash payments to a particular
physician "were 'for no other purpose' than 'inducing the referral of Medicare patients').
38. 760 F.2d 68, 72 (3d Cir. 1985).
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who served as President of Cardio-Med., Inc. (Cardio-Med), a company
that provided diagnostic services.3 9 When a physician ordered a diagnostic
service from Cardio-Med for a Medicare beneficiary, Cardio-Med would
bill Medicare for the service and, after receiving reimbursement, would
forward a portion of the reimbursement, referred to as a "consulting fee,"
to the ordering physician.40 The Defendant testified that if he did not pay
the physicians their "consulting fees," the physicians would not order
diagnostic services from Cardio-Med.4 '
At trial, the judge instructed the jury that if one purpose of the
"consulting fees" paid to the physicians was to induce their ordering of
services from Cardio-Med, the Anti-Kickback Statute had been violated.42
Defendant argued that the jury charge was erroneous; that is, the Statute
was violated only when the only purpose behind the fees was to improperly
induce patient referrals.43 The Third Circuit upheld the trial court's
instruction, ruling that the Anti-Kickback Statute was violated when one
purpose of the fees was to induce the use of Cardio-Med's services, even
if the payments were also intended to compensate the physicians for other
consulting services.44
In addition to interpretive case law, the Office of Inspector General
(OIG) has promulgated a number of safe harbor regulations. 45  These
regulations carve out shelters for arrangements that do not violate the Anti-
Kickback Statute even though the arrangements may, on their face, appear
to be capable of inducing referrals in violation of the Statute.46
Arrangements sheltered under the safe harbor regulations include, but are
not limited to, certain equipment rental payments, personal services
payments, management payments, sale of practice payments, warranty
payments, practitioner recruitment payments, payments to group
purchasing organizations, obstetrical malpractice insurance subsidies,
non-monetary remuneration necessary for electronic health records, and
non-monetary remuneration necessary for electronic prescribing.47
Common among sheltered payments is the requirement that the payment
39. Id. at 69-70.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 70.
42. Id. at 71.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 72.
45. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)-(bb) (2017).
46. See Jeffrey Schwartz, Elaborating on Sham Transactions as Evidence of Violations of the
Anti-Kickback Statute, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 357, 367-68 (2003) (discussing the safe harbor
regulations).
47. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)-(bb).
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be consistent with fair market value in an arms-length transaction and not
determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any
referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under a federal health care
program.48
The Department of Justice (DOJ) actively enforces the Anti-Kickback
Statute. As a recent example, the DOJ announced in August 2018 that
Reliant Rehabilitation Holdings (Reliant), a provider of rehabilitation
services in north Texas, agreed to pay $6.1 million to resolve allegations
that Reliant paid illegal remuneration to nursing homes and doctors in
connection with care provided to Medicare and Medicaid patients. 4 9
United States Attorneys for the Northern District of Texas argued that
Reliant offered nursing homes illegal remuneration, including nurse-
practitioner services at free or below-market-value rates, "in order to
induce or reward nursing homes for contracting with Reliant to provide
rehabilitation therapy for their residents."50
Even more recently, the DOJ announced in November 2018 the
conviction of fifty-six-year-old Sophia Eggleston, a patient recruiter from
Detroit, Michigan, on two counts of receiving kickbacks in violation of the
Anti-Kickback Statute." After a three-day trial in the Eastern District of
Michigan, a federal jury found that Eggleston participated in an illegal
kickback scheme between 2009 and 2012 pursuant to which she "solicited
and received kickbacks in exchange for referring Medicare beneficiaries
to serve as patients at a home health agency owned by Eggleston's co-
48. Id. § 1001.952(b)(5) (including within the space rental safe harbor a requirement that the
aggregate space rental charge be "consistent with fair market value in arms-length transactions and is
not determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or business
otherwise generated between the parties for which payment may be made in whole or in part under
Medicare, Medicaid or other Federal health care programs."); id. § 1001.952(d)(5) (including within
the personal services and management contracts safe harbor a requirement that the "aggregate
compensation paid to the agent over the term of the agreement is set in advance, is consistent with fair
market value in arms-length transactions and is not determined in a manner that takes into account the
volume or value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under Medicare, Medicaid or other Federal health care
programs.").
49. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Reliant to Pay $6.1 Million to
Settle False Claims Act Allegations That It Paid Kickbacks to Nursing Homes for Rehabilitation
Therapy Business (Aug. 23, 2018), https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/reliant-pay-61-million-settle-
false-claims-act-allegations-it-paid-kickbacks-nursing-homes [https://perma.cc/8TYB-ASTU]
[hereinafter Reliant Press Release] (announcing the settlement); see also Order of Dismissal, United
States ex rel. Prose v. Reliant Rehab., No. 3:16-cv-0707 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2018).
50. Reliant Press Release, supra note 49.
51. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Patient Recruiter Convicted in
$1.1 Million Kickback Scheme (Nov. 5, 2018), https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/patient-recruiter-
convicted-11-million-kickback-scheme [https://perma.cc/P9UT-MENM].
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conspirators."5 2 The scheme resulted in the submission of approximately
$1.1 million in claims to Medicare for home health services purportedly
provided to the referred Medicare beneficiaries.53
B. Application to the Opioid Context
1. Physician Receipt of Remuneration from Pharmaceutical Companies
in Return for Opioid Prescriptions
A number of physicians have been convicted of violating the Anti-
Kickback Statute for receiving remuneration from pharmaceutical
companies in return for the prescription of opioids manufactured by those
companies. In March 2018, for example, Judge John McConnell of the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island sentenced
sixty-three-year-old Dr. Jerrold Rosenberg, a Brown University faculty
member, to fifty-one months in prison and $754,736 in restitution for
receiving $188,000 in sham speaker fees from Insys Therapeutics, Inc.
(Insys) between 2012 and 2015.54
As background, Insys manufactures and markets Subsys, a highly
addictive, fentanyl-based, sublingual spray drug approved by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) for opioid-tolerant, adult cancer patients who
experience break-through cancer pain.5 5 Due to concerns regarding life-
threatening respiratory depression and death, the FDA has contraindicated
Subsys for use in opioid non-tolerant, non-cancer patients, including
patients who experience post-operative pain as well as headaches, back
pain, and joint pain.56
Dr. Rosenberg, a Subsys prescriber, admitted that he received the
speaker fees from Insys even when he did not make any type of
presentation on Insys's behalf and when presentation sign-in sheets were
forged to include the names of health care practitioners with prescriptive
authority who did not attend the (nonexistent) presentations.5 Although
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Janelle Lawrence & Jef Feeley, Ivy League Doctor Gets 4 Years in Prison for Insys Opioid
Kickbacks, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 9, 2018, 1:24 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
03-09/ivy-league-doctor-gets-4-years-prison-for-insys-opioid-kickbacks [https://perma.cc/9XLV-
ZNXL].
55. Second Amended Complaint for Violations of the False Claims Act & State False Claims
Acts at 6, ¶¶ 25-26, Filed Under Seal, United States ex rel. Guzman v. INSYS Therapeutic Inc., No.
2:13-cv-05861 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) [hereinafter Guzman Second Amended Complaint].
56. Id. at 27, ¶ 140.
57. Benjamin Weiser & Katie Thomas, 5 Doctors Are Charged with Taking Kickbacks for
Fentanyl Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
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the pharmaceutical industry has long paid influential doctors to give
presentations to peer prescribers as part of drug marketing campaigns,"
Dr. Rosenberg admitted that the sham speaker fees paid by Insys played a
role in his decision to prescribe Subsys, including his decision to prescribe
Subsys for ineligible patients; that is, opioid non-tolerant patients whose
pain was not caused by cancer.5 9 Perhaps worse than his acceptance of
sham speaker fees in return for his writing of Subsys prescriptions, federal
prosecutors also showed that Dr. Rosenberg "ignored and bullied patients
who resisted staying on the powerful pain-killing spray." 60  During
sentencing, Judge McConnell told Dr. Rosenberg: "You in effect sold your
medical license to a pharmaceutical company" 6 ' and reminded the
disgraced physician that "[g]reed has no role in that sacred relationship
that exists between a doctor and a patient." 62 As discussed above, the Anti-
Kickback Statute is premised on a number of concerns, including
corruption of medical decision making. 63 Dr. Rosenberg's receipt of
remuneration from Insys corrupted his medical decision making, even to
the point where he bullied addicted patients-including those who
requested assistance with stopping Subsys-into staying on Subsys.
Dr. Rosenberg is not the only physician who received remuneration
from Insys in return for writing Subsys prescriptions for federal health care
program patients. In February 2018, Judge Arthur Tarnow of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan sentenced fifty-
nine-year-old Dr. Gavin Awerbuch to thirty-two months in prison and $4.1
million in restitution and fines after finding that, among other
improprieties, Dr. Awerbuch received from Insys $138,435 in sham
03/16/nyregion/fentanyl-subsys-drug-kickbacks.html [https://perma.cc/TBR8-HEHQ].
58. Katie Thomas, Using Doctors with TroubledPasts to Market a Painkiller, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/business/drug-maker-gave-large-payments-to-
doctors-with-troubled-track-records.html [https://perma.cc/P5FT-ZVN7] ("The drug industry has
long paid influential doctors to speak to peers as a way of building word-of-mouth marketing.");
Charlotte Hu, Opioid Overdose Deaths Are Highest in Places Where Pharma Spends the Most on
Marketing, A New Study Finds, Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 13, 2018, 10:07 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/relationship-between-opioid-deaths-and-pharma-marketing-
spending-2018-11 [https://perma.cc/M8HY-WG9V] ("In 2016, the pharmaceutical industry doled out
nearly $10 million to US physicians for opioid-related marketing. That includes speaking and
consulting fees .... ).
59. Nate Raymond, Doctor in Insys Opioid Kickback Scheme Gets Four Years in Prison,
REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2018, 5:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insys-opioids/doctor-in-insys-
opioid-kickback-scheme-gets-four-years-in-prison-idUSKCN1GL1DP [https://perma.cc/K3L3-
3JUQ].
60. Lawrence & Feeley, supra note 54.
61. Id.
62. Raymond, supra note 59.
63. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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speaker fees in return for prescribing Subsys, including for patients who
had no legitimate medical need for the drug.64 In the six-month period
prior to Dr. Awerbuch making his first (alleged) speech in October 2012
on Insys's behalf, Dr. Awerbuch wrote, on average, fewer than thirteen
prescriptions for Subsys each month. In the six months after his first
(alleged) speech on Insys's behalf, Dr. Awerbuch wrote, on average,
approximately 118 prescriptions for Subsys each month.65 Dr. Awerbuch
was the highest prescriber of Subsys to Medicare beneficiaries nationally,
writing more than twenty percent of all Subsys prescriptions for Medicare
beneficiaries between 2009 and 2015.66 The cost to Medicare of the 1,283
Medicare beneficiary prescriptions written by Dr. Awerbuch reached
nearly $7 million.67
Drs. Rosenberg and Awerbuch are not the only physicians who have
violated the Anti-Kickback Statute in the context of opioid prescriptions.
In February 2017, an Alabama jury found that Drs. John Patrick Couch
and Xiulu Ruan received remuneration from Insys and other
pharmaceutical manufacturers in return for writing opioid prescriptions in
violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. 68 As background, Drs. Couch and
Ruan owned and operated a practice in Mobile, Alabama, called
Physician's Pain Specialists of Alabama (PPSA). 69 Between 2012 and
2015, Dr. Couch received at least $100,000 in sham speaking fees and Dr.
Ruan received at least $170,000 in sham speaking fees from Insys. 70 An
Insys Sales Representative named Natalie Perhacs admitted in her own
guilty plea (in which she admitted that she paid remuneration to Drs.
Couch and Ruan in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute) that she
64. Steve Friess, Doctor Tied to Insys OpioidKickbackProbe Gets Prison Term, REUTERS (Feb.
26, 2018, 4:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insys-opioids/doctor-tied-to-insys-opioid-
kickback-probe-gets-prison-term-idUSKCN1GA2WE [https://perma.cc/68GH-Z6U7].
65. United States' Complaint in Intervention at 17, ¶ 63, U.S. v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No.
14-cv-3488 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018) [hereinafter U.S. Complaint in Intervention].
66. Catherine Shaffer, Founder of Opioid Company Arrested on Racketeering and Fraud
Charges, MICH. RADIO NEWS (Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.michiganradio.org/post/founder-opioid-
company-arrested-racketeering-and-fraud-charges [https://perma.cc/79WB-LHDP] ("Awerbuch
wrote more than twenty percent of Subsys prescriptions for Medicare beneficiaries nationwide
between 2009 and 2014. Awerbuch pled guilty to health care fraud and distribution of controlled
substances in 2016.").
67. Guzman Second Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 24, ¶ 123.
68. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, S. Dist. of Ala., Dr. Couch and
Dr. Ruan Sentenced to 240 and 252 Months in Federal Prison for Running Massive Pill Mill (May 26,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdal/pr/dr-couch-and-dr-ruan-sentenced-240-and-252-months-
federal-prison-nmning-massive-pill [https://perma.cc/DZ9F-YPKU] [hereinafter Couch and Ruan
Press Release].
69. Id.
70. Id.
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scheduled approximately one speaker program per week for Drs. Couch
and Ruan but that, for the majority of such programs, the physicians either:
(1) spoke to the same prescribers over and over again about Subsys; (2)
spoke to non-prescribing PPSA staff about Subsys; or (3) did not speak
about Subsys at all,' thus negating any substantive justification for the
speaker programs and, therefore, the speaker payments. During the year
2014, Drs. Couch and Ruan were writing opioid prescriptions as fast as
one prescription every four minutes. 72 The total cost to the government of
these prescriptions was $15.5 million.73
At the conclusion of their seven-week trial, the jury found the
Alabama-based physicians guilty of several federal criminal offenses,
including receiving remuneration from Insys in return for prescribing
Subsys in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.74 Some of the patients
for whom Drs. Couch and Ruan prescribed Subsys included non-cancer
patients who experienced traditional neck, back, and joint pain; that is,
patients for whom the FDA expressly contraindicated Subsys. In May
2017, Senior Judge Callie Virginia Smith Granade of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama sentenced Drs. Couch
and Ruan to twenty and twenty-one years in prison, respectively.7 5
2. Non-Physician Receipt of Remuneration from Pharmaceutical
Companies in Return for Opioid Prescriptions
The above section described three cases involving four physicians
who admitted they received, or who were found by ajury to have received,
remuneration in the form of sham speaker fees in return for opioid
prescriptions in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. Other non-
physician prescribers, including nurse practitioners and physician
assistants, also have accepted remuneration from pharmaceutical
companies in return from prescribing opioids manufactured by those
companies in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.
71. See United States' Complaint in Intervention, supra note 64, at 14-15, ¶ 49.
72. J.B. Biunno, Mobile Pain Doctors Found Guilty ofRunning Pill Mill, NEWS5 WKRG (Feb.
23, 2018, 10:45 AM), https://www.wkrg.com/news/local-news/breaking-mobile-pain-doctors-found-
guilty-of-running-pill-mill/867786039 [https://perma.cc/NLY9-8K3K] ("In the first indictment filed
against the doctors, investigators gathered evidence that Couch and Ruan wrote 66,892 prescriptions
combined in 2014, deliberately 'over-prescribing controlled substances to increase revenue.' It
amounted to writing a prescription once every four minutes.").
73. Jill Riepenhoff, Case Study: Drs. John P. Couch and Xiulu Ruan, ABC7 WWSB (Feb. 26,
2018, 3:46 PM), http://www.mysuncoast.com/story/37546844/case-study-drs-john-p-couch-and-
xiulu-ruan/ [https://perma.cc/Z6ZZ-DZ3Z] (last updated Oct. 17, 2018, 7:01 PM).
74. Couch and Ruan Press Release, supra note 68.
75. Id.
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For example, Heather Alfonso, a Connecticut-licensed nurse
practitioner who worked at the Comprehensive Pain and Headache
Treatment Center in Derby, Connecticut, pled guilty in June 2015 to
receiving kickbacks from Insys in return for prescribing Subsys.76
Prosecutors showed that between January 2013 and March 2015, Ms.
Alfonso received approximately $83,000 in speaker fees from Insys for
participating in more than seventy "dinner programs."" Frequently, the
only attendee at these "dinner programs" was an Insys sales representative
or a friend or co-worker of Ms. Alfonso who had no prescriptive
authority," thus negating any substantive justification for the program.
Ms. Alfonso, who was one of the top-ten highest prescribers of Subsys in
the U.S., admitted that the speaker fees she accepted influenced her
prescription of the highly-addictive drug, including for non-cancer
patients who had chronic pain not associated with cancer:7 9 "If I was going
to choose between one drug or another, I would choose the Subsys because
that's what I was getting paid for."so Judge Michael Shea of the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut has delayed Ms.
Alfonso's sentencing numerous times due to her cooperation with federal
and state investigators in other health care fraud cases.'
The Government has investigated other non-physician opioid
prescribers, including physician assistants, for their receipt of
remuneration from pharmaceutical manufacturers in violation of the Anti-
Kickback Statute. In March 2017, for example, physician assistant
Christopher Clough was indicted for accepting remuneration from Insys
in return for prescribing Subsys.82 Mr. Clough treated pain patients in
76. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Dist. ofConn., APRN Admits
Receiving Kickbacks from Drug Company for Prescribing Pain Medication (June 23, 2015),
https://wwwjustice.gov/usao-ct/pr/apm-admits-receiving-kickbacks-drug-company-prescribing-
pain-medication [https://perma.cc/AM93-DRKU] [hereinafter Alfonso Press Release]; Katie Thomas,
Nurse Pleads Guilty to Taking Kickbacks from Drug Maker, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/business/nurse-pleads-guilty-to-taking-kickbacks-from-drug-
maker.html [https://perma.cc/3F2K-G2TP].
77. Alfonso Press Release, supra note 76.
78. Id.
79. Lisa Chedekel, Case Against Derby Nurse Involves Potent Painkiller, HARTFORD COURANT
(June 24, 2015, 6:17 PM), https://www.courant.com/health/hc-nurse-indicted-drug-kickbacks-folo-
20150624-story.html [https://perma.cc/JYE9-AXWJ].
80. Janelle Lawrence, Opioid Nurse Sold Out Patients for $82,000 in Insys Kickbacks,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-
12/opioid-nurse-sold-out-patients-for-82-000-in-insys-kickbacks [https://perma.cc/BMR4-49E2].
81. Id; Lisa Chedekel, Derby Nurse's Sentencing Delayed Six Months, NEW HAVEN REG. (Jan.
24, 2017, 11:38 AM), https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Derby-nurse-s-sentencing-
delayed-six-months-i 1313986.php [https://perma.cc/3C7D-WNAP].
82. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Dist. ofN.H., Former Physician
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Somersworth, New Hampshire and is alleged to have received
approximately $40,000 in speaker fees from Insys.83 As with the other
Subsys prescribers discussed above, Mr. Clough likely gave no
presentations to peer prescribers at all and/or sign-in sheets were forged to
include the names of prescriber attendees who did not attend the (likely
non-existent) presentations.84
3. Prescriber Receipt of Remuneration from Pharmacists in Return for
Opioid Prescriptions Filled at Related Pharmacies
In addition to prescribers who have received remuneration from
pharmaceutical companies in return for prescriptions of opioids
manufactured by those same companies, prescribers also have received
remuneration from pharmacists in return for opioid prescriptions that were
filled at related pharmacies. For example, Dr. Carl Dennis Fowler, a sixty-
one-year-old physician who practiced family medicine in West
Bloomfield, Michigan, was convicted in March 2014 of receiving
remuneration in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute." As background,
Michigan pharmacist Babubhai Patel (Patel) owned and operated twenty-
six pharmacies (the Patel Pharmacies) in the greater Detroit area. 86 Dr.
Fowler wrote numerous prescriptions for expensive drugs, without regard
to whether the drugs were medically necessary, that could be filled at one
of the Patel Pharmacies, as well as prescriptions for OxyContin and
oxycodone, which were later resold on the street market.87 A jury found
that Dr. Fowler received from Patel bribes and kickbacks in return for Dr.
Fowler's prescription of expensive drugs, including opioids, that were
filled at one of the Patel Pharmacies and that were billed to Medicare and
Medicaid."
Assistant Charged in Healthcare Kickback Scheme (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
nh/pr/former-physician-assistant-charged-healthcare-kickback-scheme [https://perma.cc/4F9X-
4DYW].
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, E. Dist. of Mich., Jury Convicts
Doctor, Pharmacist, Marketer in Health Care Fraud Scheme (Mar. 7, 2014),
https://wwwjustice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/jury-convicts-doctor-pharmacist-marketer-health-care-fraud-
scheme [https://perma.cc/RX88-PQR7].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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4. Physician Receipt of Remuneration from Laboratories in Return for
Drug Test Orders
The sections above described cases involving prescribers who
received remuneration in return for writing opioid prescriptions for
government program patients. Other cases implicating the Anti-Kickback
Statute involve physicians who receive remuneration in return for
referring government program patients to particular laboratories for opioid
and other drug testing services. In June 2017, for example, Judge Kim R.
Gibson of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania sentenced Dr. John H. Johnson, a Pennsylvania-licensed
physician who owned and operated a number of pain management clinics,
to eighty-four months in prison and $2.3 million in restitution upon Dr.
Johnson's conviction of violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute among
other laws.8 9
As background, Dr. Johnson had entered into a joint venture with
William Hughes, the owner of Universal Oral Fluids Lab (UOFL),
pursuant to which Dr. Johnson referred all of his patients, including his
Medicare and Medicaid patients, to UOFL for drug testing and related
services.9 0 After UOFL billed third-party payors, including Medicare and
Medicaid, UOFL kicked back to Dr. Johnson an amount for each referred
patient whose laboratory tests exceeded a certain dollar threshold,
typically $100 to $150.9' The evidence presented at trial showed that Dr.
Johnson received these kickbacks "solely in exchange for the referrals Dr.
Johnson provided to UOFL, and not in exchange for the performance of
any other services."92 The evidence also showed that UOFL received
approximately $3,443,528 from Medicare and $1,147,768 from
Pennsylvania Medicaid based on Dr. Johnson's referrals alone and that Dr.
Johnson received more than $2,300,000 in kickbacks from UOFL between
May 2011 and November 2013.93 As discussed above, the Anti-Kickback
Statute is premised on a number of concerns, including patient steering,
overutilization of health care services, and increased costs to federal health
care programs.94 The joint venture between Dr. Johnson and UOFL
89. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, W. Dist. of Pa., Physician
Sentenced to 7 Years in Prison for Accepting Kickbacks and Failing to Remit Employment Taxes
(June 30, 2017), https://wwwjustice.gov/usao-wdpa/pr/physician-sentenced-7-years-prison-
accepting-kickbacks-and-failing-remit-employment [https://perma.cc/WDG5-VA98].
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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clearly raises concerns regarding patient steering to UOFL (versus other
laboratories), overutilization of drug testing services, and increased costs
to Medicare and Pennsylvania Medicaid.
Another similar, drug-testing-referral scheme involved two pain
management physicians, Drs. Malik and Sherlekar, who owned practices
in Maryland and New Jersey. 95 A jury found that Dr. Malik accepted
remuneration from Accu-Reference, a New Jersey-based clinical
laboratory, in return for referring urine toxicology specimens to Accu-
Reference for opioid and other forms of drug testing. 96 In particular, the
Government introduced evidence showing that, between April 2011 and
July 2012, Drs. Malik and Sherlekar referred between 700 and 1,300
patient samples to Accu-Reference per month, resulting in billing claims
to Medicare and private insurers of approximately $4.4 million in
exchange for $1.4 million in kickbacks. 97 Drs. Malik and Sherlekar each
received $240,000 of the kicked-back amounts while their former practice
CEO and CFO, who received the offer of remuneration from Accu-
Reference and brought the offer to Drs. Malik and Sherlekar, received the
remainder of the remuneration.98 On September 11, 2018, Dr. Malik was
sentenced to eight years in prison. 99
5. Offer or Payment of Remuneration
In addition to prohibiting the solicitation or receipt of remuneration in
return for federal health care program business, the Anti-Kickback Statute
also prohibits the offer or payment of such remuneration.' 0 0 Several
individuals have pled guilty to offering or paying remuneration to
individuals with prescriptive authority in violation of the Anti-Kickback
Statute. For example, Jeffrey Pearlman, an Insys district sales manager
responsible for Insys sales in New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the Anti-
95. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Dist. of Md., Pain Management
Physician Sentenced to 8 Years in Federal Prison for Central Role in Million Dollar Kickback Scheme
and Fraudulent Billing Scheme (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/pain-
management-physician-sentenced-8-years-federal-prison-central-role-million-dollar
[https://perma.cc/5ZYB-5K3X].
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. Dr. Sherlekar committed suicide shortly after he was indicted and, as a result, was neither
tried nor sentenced. Id
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(2) (2012).
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Kickback Statute in August 2018.101 In his plea agreement, Pearlman
admitted to conspiring to induce physicians, physician assistants, and
nurse practitioners to prescribe Subsys by paying them speaker fees "that
ranged from $1,000 to several thousand dollars."'02 As in the other
speaker fee cases discussed above, the speaker fees paid by Pearlman
were, in theory, to help Insys educate opioid prescribers about Subsys.' 03
In reality, the presentations were non-educational gatherings held at
expensive restaurants attended by friends and co-workers, most of whom
did not have prescriptive authority,'04 thus negating the substantive
justification for the speaker programs and, thus, the speaker fees. One
such dinner occurred at a restaurant in New Haven, Connecticut, where
Pearlman paid a Connecticut-licensed physician a speaker fee even though
the physician did not make any type of educational presentation, and even
though no other health care professionals with prescriptive authority were
present to learn from the (non-existent) presentation. o Pearlman's
sentencing was originally scheduled for October 31, 2018, although it
appears to have been delayed.' 06
101. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Dist. of Conn., Drug Company
Manager Admits Role in Kickback Scheme Related to Fentanyl Spray Prescriptions (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://wwwjustice.gov/usao-ct/pr/drug-company-manager-admits-role-kickback-scheme-related-
fentanyl-spray-prescriptions [https://perma.cc/W3R7-Z844].
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. As of this writing, other Insys employees are being investigated and/or tried for the
improper offer or payment of illegal remuneration to Subsys prescribers. See, e.g., Janelle Lawrence,
Insys Founder's Protege Was 'Fall Guy' When Opioid Plan Faltered, BLOOMBERG (last updated Feb.
15, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-15/insys-founder-s-protege-
was-fall-guy-when-opioid-plan-faltered [https://perma.cc/93Y4-55MQ] (reporting that Michael
Babich, Insys' Chief Executive Officer, recently pled guilty to conspiracy of violating the Anti-
Kickback Statute for paying remuneration to prescribers to induce their prescription of Subsys); Chris
Dolmetsch, New York Doctor Pleads Guilty to Taking Kickbacks From Insys, BLOOMBERG L. NEWS
(Feb. 14, 2019, 1:53 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XF7ULOAOOOOOOO?
bnanewsfilter-health-law-and-business&jcsearch=BNAo252000000168ed4ad633adfdff5e49b30
000#jcite (reporting that Alexandru Burducea, a New York physician who specialized in pain
management, pled guilty on February 14, 2019, to conspiracy to violate the Anti-Kickback statute by
accepting remuneration from Insys in exchange for prescribing Subsys); Janelle Lawrence, How the
'Worst'Launch in Pharma History Spurred Opioid Surge, BLOOMBERG (last updated Feb. 13, 2019,
11:54 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-13/how-the-worst-launch-in-
pharma-history-spurred-opioid-surge [https://perma.cc/69TA-XB5R] (discussing the ongoing
racketeering trial of Insys founder John Kapoor); Janelle Lawrence, OpioidRap Video Adding to John
Kapoor's Woes at Insys Trial, BLOOMBERG (last updated Feb. 14, 2019, 9:23 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-13/opioid-rap-video-adding-to-john-kapoor-s-
woes-at-insys-trial [https://perma.cc/35 S8-ND8V] (reporting on the racketeering trial of Insys founder
John Kapoor, including prosecutors' admission into evidence of an Insys rap video designed to
influence physicians to prescribe higher doses of Subsys).
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Several opioid manufacturers also have settled allegations of
violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute's offer or payment prohibitions.
For example, in September 2017, the DOJ announced that Galena
Biopharma, Inc. (Galena) would pay more than $7.55 million to resolve
allegations that it violated the federal False Claims Act by violating the
Anti-Kickback Statute; that is, by paying remuneration to physicians to
induce the physicians to prescribe Galena's fentanyl-based drug,
Abstral.10 7 In particular, the Government alleged that Galena offered and
paid both in-kind and cash remuneration to physicians to induce their
prescriptions, including: (1) "providing more than 85 free meals to
physicians and staff from a single, high-prescribing, [medical] practice";
(2) paying physicians and speakers between $5,000 and $6,000 to attend a
questionable "advisory board" meeting that was planned and attended only
by Galena sales team members; (3) "paying approximately $92,000 to a
physician-owned pharmacy under a performance-based rebate agreement
to induce the pharmacy owners[,]" none other than Alabama-based Drs.
Couch and Ruan, to prescribe Abstral; and (4) paying physicians to refer
patients to the company's patient registry study that ostensibly was
designed to collect data on patient experiences with Abstral but in reality
served as a means to induce physicians to prescribe Abstral.'os In the press
release announcing the settlement, William E. Fitzpatrick, the Acting
United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey stated, "The conduct
alleged by the government and resolved by today's settlement was
egregious because it incentivized doctors to over-prescribe highly
addictive opioids."' 09
Other opioid manufacturers also have initiated settlement discussions
regarding allegations of violations of the offer or pay prohibitions within
the Anti-Kickback Statute. On August 8, 2018, the media (perhaps
presumptuously) reported that Insys would pay at least $150 million to
settle DOJ allegations that it violated the offer or pay prohibitions within
the Anti-Kickback Statute including in connection with payments made to
many of the recipients discussed earlier in this Article."o The media
107. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Galena Biopharma Inc. to Pay
More Than $7.55 Million to Resolve Alleged False Claims Related to Opioid Drug (Sept. 8, 2018),
https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/galena-biopharma-inc-pay-more-755-million-resolve-alleged-false-
claims-related-opioid-drug [https://perma.cc/QD9G-2YMG].
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Nate Raymond & Andy Thibault, Insys to Pay $150 Million to Settle U.S. Opioid
Kickback Probe, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2018, 7:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insys-
opioids/insys-to-pay-150-million-to-settle-u-s-opioid-kickback-probe-idUSKBN1KT1G5
[https://perma.cc/4RPZ-4E2T] (announcing the settlement).
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further reported on that same date that Insys would pay the $150 million
over five years and would potentially make up to $75 million in additional
payments."' The media quoted Insys CEO Saeed Motahari as stating,
"This [settlement] is a very important step for our company to move
forward and continue our transformative efforts to foster a compliant and
ethical culture."" 2 On February 5, 2019, a status report filed with the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
referenced a "settlement-in-principle" that was allegedly reached by and
between the federal and state government plaintiffs and Insys on August 9
[not 8], 2018; however, that filing also stated that "discussions regarding
these settlement issues . . . are currently ongoing and remain incomplete.
Among other things, the parties continue to discuss and attempt to resolve
various criminal, civil, and administrative issues towards the finalization
of the settlement-in-principle reached by them in August 2018."113
The Insys settlement discussions have their roots in five separate qui
tam cases, including the first qui tam case that was filed under seal by
relator Maria Guzman in August 2013.114 In April 2018, the U.S.
Government intervened in the five (now consolidated) cases, " which
were partially unsealed in May 2018.116 Guzman's complaint alleges that
Insys sales representatives paid Subsys prescribers speaker fees"'7 and
other cash amounts as high as $100,0001" as well as in-kind remuneration
including stock options,119 sexual favors,1 20 escort services,121 strip
111. Id
112. Id
113. United States of America's Status Report at 3-4, United States ex rel. Guzmam v. Insys
Therapeutics, No. 2:13-cv-5861-JLS (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2019).
114. Complaint, United States ex. rel. Guzman v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-5861-
JLS (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Guzman First Complaint]; Guzman Second
Amended Complaint, supra note 55. See generally Michael Filoromo & Matthew LaGarde, Insight:
Leveraging the False Claims Act to Combat Opioid Misuse, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 2, 2018, 9:01 AM),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XCMEE170000000?bnanewsfilter-health-law-and-
business&jcsearch=BNA%/0252000000164f57fdb1faff7fd7f517c0002#jcite [https://perma.cc/394U-
F2HX] (noting that relator Maria Guzman filed the first of the five underlying qui tam actions and that
all five actions were ultimately consolidated and transferred to the United States District Court for the
Central District of California).
115. U.S. Complaint in Intervention, supra note 65.
116. Order Unsealing Cases, United States v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-5861 JLS
(AJWx) (C.D. Cal., May 11, 2018).
117. Guzman Second Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 14-17, ¶¶ 66-84.
118. Id at 12, ¶58.
119. Id
120. Id at 8,¶38.
121. Id at 11, 53.
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dances,12 trips to shooting ranges,1' lunches for physician office staff,124
coolers of filet mignon steaks,' 25 and the hiring of prescribers' significant
othersl26 in return for the prescription of Subsys.
The factual allegations set forth in the consolidated qui tam actions
against Insys are bold and specific. For example, one of the lawsuits
quotes a text message written by an Insys employee stating, "Don't worry
about [the physicians'] speaking abilities. They do not need to be good
speakers. They need to write a lot of Subsys."12 7 Statements like these
provide strong evidence that the purpose of the Insys speaker programs
was not to educate peer prescribers but, instead, to exchange remuneration
for selected speakers' writing of Subsys prescriptions.
By further example, the same lawsuit quotes a text message sent by an
Insys employee to a particular physician who not only practiced medicine
but also owned a restaurant. The text message to the physician stated, "'I
can commit to 100k to you via speaker programs or meals towards your
restaurant. We don't need the food, just charge our card and give [us] an
itemized receipt. Just need your support on [S]ubsys.""2 8 When the Insys
employee stated that Insys does not need the food provided by the
physician's restaurant, the Insys employee is eliminating the only
legitimate reason for Insys's payment to the restaurant. Then, when the
Insys employee stated that Insys "[j]ust need[s] your support on
[S]ubsys,"12 9 the employee is essentially admitting that the purpose of the
payment is to induce Subsys prescriptions.
The same lawsuit also quotes a text message written by an Insys
employee to a potential prescribing physician stating that the employee
wants to know if the physician's girlfriend would like a full-time job
working for the employee. 3 0 The text message further states, "I could also
use a few Subsys prescriptions. We have not seen anything, I want to have
some fun!!! Can't do it [without] [S]ubsys scripts coming in at least once
a day. Have [your girlfriend] call me next week."' 3 ' This text message is
strong evidence that the Insys employee is willing to hire the physician's
122. Id at 18, 86.
123. Id at 19, 92.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 25-26, ¶ 131.
126. Id. at 12, 58.
127. Id. at 15, 70.
128. Id. at 16,¶75.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 22, 116.
131. Id.
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girlfriend in exchange for the physician writing at least one Subsys
prescription per day. Stated another way, the hiring of the girlfriend
appears to be in-kind remuneration offered in return for Subsys
prescriptions.
On November 6, 2018, the media reported that Insys was looking to
sell its opioid-related assets, including Subsys.' 32 It is likely that the
company's allegedly looming $150 million settlement payment, its
inability to further trade remuneration for Subsys prescriptions, and the
negative press associated with Insys's role in the still-strong opioid crisis,
impacted this decision.
III. THE FEDERAL CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A. Background
In addition to the Anti-Kickback Statute, the federal government has
other tools designed to combat opioid fraud and abuse, including the
federal civil False Claims Act (FCA). The FCA creates civil liability for
any person who: (1) "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false
or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" to the federal government,
including a false Medicare or Medicaid claim; (2) "knowingly makes,
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement [that is]
material to a false or fraudulent claim"; (3) knowingly uses a false
statement to decrease an obligation to pay money to the government; and
(4) conspires with respect to the preceding conduct, among other illegal
conduct.'33 Examples of Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal claims
that violate the FCA include claims for health care services not actually
provided, claims that misrepresent the level of health care services that
were provided (e.g., up-coding a health care service to receive a higher
level of reimbursement), claims for unnecessary health care services,
claims for health care services performed by health care providers
excluded from participating in federal health care programs, and the
submission of false information about a health care service provided or a
charge for such service. 3 4 Knowing conduct includes conduct involving
132. Maria Armental, Insys Looks to Sell Opioid-Related Assets, Including Subsys, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 6, 2018, 12:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/insys-looks-to-sell-opioid-related-assets-
including-subsys-1541482212 [https://perma.cc/47WF-GZEG].
133. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), and (G) (2012); id. § 3729(b)(2) (defining claim).
134. See generally Magellan Health Services, Inc., Fraud Waste and Abuse Training for
Medicare and Medicaid Providers PowerPoint, at PowerPoint Slides 13-14,
https://www.magellanprovider.com/MHS/MGL/about/handbooks/supplements/fwatraining.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8K2B-8HUR] (last visited Mar. 18, 2019) (listing illustrative examples of FCA
2019 921
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
actual knowledge of a falsehood as well as conduct involving deliberate
ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth.'35
Per the terms of the FCA, individuals who violate the law are "liable
to the federal government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and
not more than $10,000, as thereafter may be adjusted by the Federal Civil
Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 [(FCPIIA)], plus three times
the amount of damages" (called "treble damages"). 3 6  For penalties
assessed after January 29, 2018, the most recent FCPIIA adjustment has
increased the civil penalty range from not less than $11,181 to not more
than $22,363.137 Because the FCA is a civil statute, the burden of proof
for an FCA violation is the preponderance of the evidence standard.' 38
Claims that violate the FCA may be classified as factually false or
legally false. Factually false claims include claims or supporting
documentation that are false on their face, such as claims that knowingly
contain improper codes, claims for (nonexistent) care provided to fictitious
patients, and claims supported by falsified medical record or other
documentation. "9 Legally false claims are different than factually false
claims in that they may, at first glance, appear to be facially, technically
accurate in the sense that a provider may have seen a patient in the office
for a twenty-five-minute visit and the accompanying claim may state that
a twenty-five-minute office visit occurred.1 4 0  However, because the
provider failed to meet an applicable statute or regulation in connection
with the office visit, the claim for the visit is classified as legally false.141
violations).
135. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (2012).
136. Id. § 3729(a)(1) (setting forth these statutory amounts).
137. Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, Final Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 3944-01, 3945 (Jan.
29, 2018) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 85), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2018/01/29/2018-01464/civil-monetary-penalties-inflation-adjustment [https://perma.cc/
PW6A-NTBX] (setting forth new amounts that apply for violations after certain dates in 2017 and
2018).
138. 31 U.S.C. § 373 1(d) (2012) ("In any action brought under Section 3730, the United States
shall be required to prove all essential elements of the cause of action, including damages, by a
preponderance of the evidence.").
139. See Burke v. Record Press, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2013) A claim can be
"factually false if it invoices for services that were not rendered" or incorrectly describes goods or
services provided."'); Christopher L. Martin, Jr., Reining in Lincoln's Law: A Call to Limit the Implied
Certification Theory ofLiability Under the False Claims Act, 101 CAL. L. REv. 227, 230 (2013)
("Courts originally interpreted the phrase 'false or fraudulent claim' in a limited fashion to mean a
'factually false claim,' which is a claim for payment containing 'an incorrect description of goods or
services provided or a request for reimbursement for goods or services never provided.').
140. Burke, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 30.
141. Id. (quoting United States v. DRC, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 159, 167 (D.D.C. 2012)) A claim
may be "legally false" if it represents falsely that the party submitting the claim has complied with an
applicable federal statute or regulation, or with a contractual term."').
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Legally false claims may be further divided into express false
certifications and implied false certifications, depending on the type of
certification made (or not) on the claim or invoice.'4 2 An express false
certification occurs when a claimant makes an "explicitly false
certification of compliance with an underlying program condition, such as
by signing a false certification statement" on a claim or invoice.1 4 3 In the
absence of an explicitly false certification, some courts in certain situations
imply compliance with federal laws as part of the claimant's submission
of a reimbursement claim.1 44  Stated another way, an implied false
certification occurs when a claimant submits a reimbursement claim
without disclosing that the claimant is in violation of a legal requirement
that affects the claimant's eligibility for payment.1 45
In its 2016 decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States
ex rel. Escobar, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved a circuit
split regarding the viability of implied false certification claims, holding
that such claims are permissible under the FCA.1 4 6 The Court stated that
"misrepresentations by omission can give rise to liability,"147 reasoning
that "half-truths-representations that state the truth only so far as it goes,
while omitting critical qualifying information can be actionable."1 48 The
Court also held that, "when a defendant submits a claim, it impliedly
certifies compliance with all conditions of payment."149 However, the
Court also inserted a materiality requirement; that is, a "misrepresentation
142. See, e.g., Benjamin Dacin, Legal Materiality and the Implied Certification Theory of the
False Claims Act: Why Courts Have Rejected the Traditional Standards of Materiality in Favor of a
Precondition to Payment Requirement, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 31, 34 (2012) (distinguishing
between factually false and legally false claims); Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certification,
Interpretation, and the Quest for Fraud that "Counts" under the False Claims Act, 2017 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1811, 1812-13 (2017) (providing guidance regarding the types of misrepresentations that should
suffice for FCA liability under the implied false certification theory of liability; noting that, while the
implied false certification theory survived Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Escobar, without more definitive guidance the lower courts will be left to sort out confusing, highly
fact-specific cases); Joseph R. Berger, Recent Rulings on Implied Certification under the False Claims
Act: Limitations on a Common-Law Theory, 16 J. HEALTH CARE FRAUD 2, 2-10 (2010) (summarizing
district and appellate court decisions involving the implied false certification theory of liability under
the FCA); Scott Oswald et al., Health Care Law Expands False Claims Act Liability under Anti-
Kickback Statute, 26 No. 3 WESTLAW J. Gov'T CONTRACT 2,9 (2012) (explaining howthe Affordable
Care Act rendered moot the former reliance on the implied false certification theory of liability in
order to bring a False Claims Act case based on a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute).
143. Krause, supra note 142, at 1817.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2000.
149. Id. at 1995.
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about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement
must be material to the Government's payment decision in order to be
actionable . . . ."15 The Court clarified that materiality would not be found
where "noncompliance is minor or insubstantial."'' Instead, materiality
is determined by "'the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the
recipient of the alleged misrepresentation."152 Compliance with the Anti-
Kickback Statute, discussed in Part I of this Article, has been found to be
a material condition of payment by the Medicare program.'53 Indeed,
President Obama's Affordable Care Act amended the Anti-Kickback
Statute in 2010 to state that, "a claim that includes items or services
resulting from a violation of [the Anti-Kickback Statute] constitutes a false
or fraudulent claim for purposes of [the False Claims Act]."1 5 4
All pharmaceutical companies, including opioid manufacturers, must
certify compliance with a number of statutes and regulations, including
requirements set forth in the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) and the FDCA's implementing regulations."' Among other
prohibitions, the FDCA forbids false or misleadingly-labeled products as
well as products with labels that do not bear "adequate directions for
use." 5 6 The FDCA's implementing regulations clarify that directions are
inadequate if they are deficient with respect to the "conditions, purposes,
or uses" for which the drug is intended, the quantity of dose, or the
frequency of administration.5 7 The FDCA is also violated when a drug is
150. Id. at 1996, 2002 ("What matters is ... whether the defendant knowingly violated a
requirement that the defendant knows is material to the Government's payment decision. A
misrepresentation about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be
material to the Government's payment decision in order to be actionable under the False Claims Act.").
151. 1d at 2003.
152. Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016)
(quoting 26 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 69:12 (4th ed. 2003)).
153. U.S. Complaint in Intervention, supra note 71, at 35, ¶ 10-11.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2012). See also United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone
Med. Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 395 (1st Cir. 2011) ("If kickbacks affected the transaction underlying a
claim ... the claim failed to meet a condition of payment .... We find ... that the kickbacks were
capable of influencing Medicare's decision as to whether to pay the hospital and physician claims.").
155. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399f (2012 & Supp. 2017) (codifying the FDCA); 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-
201.328 (2017) (codifying the FDCA's implementing regulations).
156. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (prohibiting the introduction into interstate
commerce of misbranded drugs); id § 352(a) (stating that a drug or device is deemed to be misbranded
if its label is false or misleading); id. § 352(f) (requiring adequate directions for use); 21 C.F.R. §
201.5 (2017) (defining adequate directions for use; providing reasons directions may be inadequate
for use).
157. 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (2017) ("Adequate directions for use means directions under which the
layman can use a drug safely and for the purposes for which it is intended. Directions for use may be
inadequate because, among other reasons, of omission, in whole or in part, or incorrect specification
of... [s]tatements of all conditions, purposes, or uses for which such drug is intended, including
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marketed "off label"; that is, for a use or at a dosage other than those
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 5 1
In addition, pharmaceutical manufacturers must certify compliance
with regulations governing risk evaluation and mitigation strategies
(REMS).1 59 As background, the FDA has authority to require a REMS in
situations in which the FDA determines that safety measures (beyond
labeling) are needed to ensure that a drug's benefits outweigh its risks.'60
REMS include medication guides, communication plans, and lists of
recommendations and goals to assure the safe use of a drug.16' The FDA
explains that, "REMS focus on preventing, monitoring and/or managing a
specific serious risk by informing, educating and/or reinforcing actions to
reduce the frequency and/or severity of the event."1 62
Under the FCA's qui tam 63 provisions, a private person known as a
relator (or whistleblower) who has knowledge of past or present fraud
committed against the federal government is permitted to bring a suit in
the government's name and on the government's behalf.1 64  If the
government proceeds with the action brought by the private person, the
private person can receive "at least fifteen percent but not more than
twenty-five percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim,
depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed
to the prosecution of the action, as well as reasonable attorney's fees, costs,
and expenses."1 65 "If the government does not proceed with [the action],
the [private] person shall receive an amount . . .. not less than 25 percent
conditions, purposes, or uses for which it is prescribed, recommended, or suggested in its oral, written,
printed, or graphic advertising, and conditions, purposes, or uses for which the drug is commonly
used. . . ."); id. (including omissions or incorrect specifications relating to "[q]uantity of dose" and
"[f]requency of administration or application" within the concept of inadequate directions for use).
158. See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (defining "off-
label" uses as those that are "non-FDA approved").
159. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(e) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (providing regulations governing REMS,
including their content, communication plan).
160. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 901,121 Stat.
823 (2007).
161. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) (last updated
Feb. 2, 2018) https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/REMS/default.htm [https://perma.cc/ZXG5-
V7Q7].
162. Id.
163. The term qui tam is derived from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se
ipso in hac parte sequitur," meaning "he who sues in this matter for the king as well as for himself."
See Pamela H. Bucy, Federalism and False Claims, 28 CARDozo L. REV. 1599, 1600 (2007)
(translating and discussing the term); J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English
Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 550 (2000) (same).
164. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012) (allowing a private person to bring a civil action for violations
of 31 U.S.C. § 3729).
165. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
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and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement,
plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs. "166
A wide range of business competitors, disgruntled former employees,
over-billed patients, and other individuals have brought qui tam actions
under the FCA against pharmaceutical companies and other health
industry participants.1 67 Unless the action is brought by the Attorney
General or the person bringing the action is the original source of the
information, a court has the authority to dismiss a qui tam action if
"substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action
or claim were [already] publicly disclosed": (1) in a "hearing in which the
Government or its agent is a party;" (2) in a "federal report, hearing, audit,
or investigation;" or (3) "from the news media."1 68
Using the FCA's qui tam provisions, relators have successfully
alleged that drug manufacturers have violated the FDA's off-label
marketing prohibitions and REMS provisions in a number of non-opioid
cases, resulting in substantial settlements. In July 2017, for example, the
DOJ announced that New Jersey-based Celgene Corporation had agreed
to pay $280 million to settle fraud charges involving the company's illegal
promotion of two cancer drugs for uses not approved by the FDA.1 69 The
settlement resolved allegations that Celgene promoted its cancer drugs
Thalomid and Revlimid "for uses that were not approved by the FDA and
not covered by federal health care programs."o7 0 "The allegations included
the use of false and misleading statements about the [two cancer] drugs,"
as well as the payment of remuneration "to physicians to induce them to
prescribe the two drugs."' 7 ' In the press release announcing the settlement,
Acting United States Attorney Sandra R. Brown stated, "Patients deserve
to know their doctors are prescribing drugs that are likely to provide
effective treatment, rather than drugs marketed aggressively by
pharmaceutical companies."1 72
A few months later, in September 2017, the DOJ announced that
166. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
167. See Krause, supra note 142, at 1816.
168. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2012) (barring certain qui tam actions, including those in which the
allegations or transactions have already been publicly disclosed).
169. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Cent. Dist. of Cal., Celgene
Agrees to Pay $280 Million to Resolve Fraud Allegations Related to Promotion of Cancer Drugs for
Uses Not Approved by FDA (July 24, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/celgene-agrees-
pay-280-million-resolve-fraud-allegations-related-promotion-cancer-drugs [https://perma.cc/LZ6A-
CJ7L].
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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Aegerion Pharmaceuticals agreed to pay $35 million to the federal
government to resolve allegations that it violated the FCA by causing false
claims to be submitted to Medicare and Medicaid with respect to its
prescription drug Juxtapid.1 73 The allegations in the FCA portion of the
settlement, totaling $28.8 million, related to Aegerion's promotion of
Juxtapid for patients without a diagnosis of, or consistent with,
homozygous familial hypercholesterolemia (HoFH), which is a rare,
inherited disorder that prevents the removal of LDL-C (known as "bad
cholesterol") from the blood, causing abnormally high levels of circulating
LDL-C.1 74  The allegations in the FCA portion of the settlement also
related to Aegerion's: (1) false and misleading statements to physicians
that Juxtapid was appropriate for use in patients with high cholesterol
generally, not just patients with HoFH; and (2) "alteration or falsification
of statements of medical necessity and prior authorizations that were
submitted to federal health care programs. "175
Aegerion also pled guilty, agreeing to pay a criminal fine and
forfeiture of $7.2 million, as a result of its violations of the FDA's REMS
provisions. 17 As background, the FDA required a REMS as part of
Juxtapid's approval.1 77 "The specific purpose of the Juxtapid REMS was
to educate prescribers about the risks of liver toxicity and to restrict access
to Juxtapid only to those patients with a clinical or laboratory diagnosis
consistent with HoFH." 7 Aegerion allegedly filed a misleading REMS
assessment report and, later, failed to comply with REMS requirements,
such as distributing Juxtapid only for the treatment of HoFH (not high
cholesterol generally) without adequate directions for such use.1 7 9
Aegerion's settlement resolves a qui tam action initially filed by Michele
Clarke, Tricia Mullins, and Kristi Winger Szudlo, former Aegerion
employees, who received $4.7 million for their qui tam work.s0 Both the
Celegene and Aegerion settlements show that compliance with the FDCA
and its implementing regulations, including its "off label" marketing
173. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Drug Maker Aegerion Agrees
to Plead Guilty; Will Pay More Than $35 Million to Resolve Criminal Charges and Civil False Claims
Allegations (Sept. 22, 2017), https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/drug-maker-aegerion-agrees-plead-
guilty-will-pay-more-35-million-resolve-criminal-charges-and [https://perma.cc/LMV3-NNEG].
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Complaint, United States et al. v. Aegerion Pharm., Inc., et al., No. 13-cv-1 1785 (D.
Mass. July 26, 2013).
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prohibitions and its REMS requirements, can result in violations of the
FCA.' 8 '
B. Application to the Opioid Context
1. Cases Involving Factually False Claims
Although the legally false certification theory of FCA liability has
received significant attention in part due to the Supreme Court's 2016
opinion in United States ex rel. Escobar, health industry participants that
prescribe or dispense opioids have the potential to violate more traditional
(and academically more straightforward) provisions within the FCA,
including those that prohibit factually false claims. For example, the DOJ
announced in June 2017 that "Rhine Drug Company and Andrew 'Carter'
Clements, Jr. agreed to pay a total of $2.175 million to resolve allegations
that they violated the [FCA]."182 In particular, the Government alleged
that Rhine Drug Company and Clements violated the FCA by submitting
claims to Medicare for drugs that Rhine Drug Company had actually not
dispensed to patients.' 83
The press release announcing the settlement quoted Acting United
States Attorney James Durham as stating, "'Pharmacists are supposed to
bill only for what they dispense and they're to keep accurate records of the
prescription drugs they let walk out of their pharmacies."" 84 The press
release also quoted Derrick L. Jackson, Special Agent in Charge of the
federal Department of Health and Human Services-Office of Inspector
General (HHS-OIG) Office in Atlanta, as stating, "Billing Medicare for
prescription drugs that were never dispensed to patients is a serious
allegation. "15 The only good news about the factually false claims made
in the Rhine Drug Company case is that they do not contribute to the
patient injury (i.e., addiction) side of the opioid crisis. That is, the
181. See generally Michael Filoromo & Matthew LaGarde, Insight: Leveraging the False Claims
Act to Combat Opioid Misuse, BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Aug. 2, 2018, 9:01 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/insight-leveraging-the-false-claims-act-to-
combat-opioid-misuse [https://perma.cc/H6Z2-UZ2H] (discussing the application of the FCA to the
submission of false opioid claims).
182. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, S. Dist. of Ga., Dodge County
Pharmacy and Pharmacist to Pay Over $2 million to Resolve False Claims Act and Controlled
Substances Act Violations (June 13, 2017), https://wwwjustice.gov/usao-sdga/pr/dodge-county-
pharmacy-and-pharmacist-agree-pay-over-2-million-resolve-false-claims-act [https://perma.cc/
8MR6-HVJ4].
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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factually false bills certainly increased costs to federal health care
programs; however, no live patients received any opioids as a result of the
illegal conduct.'8 6
In a second example of a case involving factually false claims, the
DOJ announced in January 2018 that Matthew Anderson, a chiropractor
who worked in Lenior City, Tennessee, agreed to pay $1.45 million plus
interest to resolve FCA violations for his part in contributing to the
Tennessee opioid crisis.' As background, Anderson and his management
company managed four pain clinics in Tennessee, including "Cookeville
Center for Pain Management, Spinal Pain Solutions in Harriman,
Preferred Pain Center of Grundy County, and McMinnville Pain Relief
Center."' The Government alleged that Anderson and his management
company, among other illegal conduct, instructed employees at all four
clinics to up-code office visits by assigning an inaccurate billing code to
increase Medicare reimbursement. 8 9 The press release announcing the
settlement quoted Derrick L. Jackson, Special Agent in Charge of the
HHS-OIG office in Atlanta, as stating, "The opioid epidemic has had a
crushing effect on patients and families across middle Tennessee . . . Pill
mills like these billed medically unnecessary services to Medicare and
TennCare and contributed to problems of opioid abuse and addiction."' 90
In a third example of a case involving factually false claims, the qui
tam relators (and now the Government in intervention) in the consolidated
cases against Insys allege that Insys's Internal Reimbursement Center
(IRC) prepared false documentation that would accompany claims to
federal health care programs. In particular, the qui tam relators allege that
the IRC, which assisted prescribers with completing Subsys prior
authorization forms, would include in those prior authorization forms
cancer diagnoses when the patients to whom the forms related did not have
cancer or had a distant cancer diagnosis unrelated to their current pain.' 9 '
In addition, the qui tam relators allege that, in cases in which a prescriber
had included the patient's true (but non-reimbursable) diagnosis on a
Subsys prior authorization form (e.g., chronic pain or back pain), Insys
would later change that diagnosis to a false (but reimbursable) diagnosis
186. Id.
187. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Tennessee Chiropractor Pays
More Than $1.45 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/tennessee-chiropractor-pays-more-145-million-resolve-false-claims-
act-allegations [https://perma.cc/62ZW-75UK].
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Guzman Second Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 45-46, ¶¶ 228-35.
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(e.g., cancer).' 92
Unlike prescribers and dispensers, pharmaceutical manufacturers do
not actually submit claims to federal health care programs. However,
pharmaceutical manufacturers can "cause" a false claim to be submitted
(or "cause" a false, material prior authorization form to be submitted) in
cases in which the manufacturer changes a patient's diagnosis from a non-
reimbursable diagnosis to a reimbursable diagnosis on a prior
authorization form that is submitted to a payor. These types of false
statements, or records, are illegal under the FCA because the FCA creates
liability not just for those who submit false claims but also for those who
"cause" false reimbursement claims to be made or "cause" false statements
to be made in connection with claims for reimbursement.1 9 3
2. Cases Involving Legally False Claims
In addition to cases involving factually false claims, several health
industry participants have settled FCA allegations predicated on violations
of material statutes and regulations including, but not limited to,
provisions within the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). These cases are
known as legally false claims cases. For example, PharMerica
Corporation agreed to pay the Government $31.5 million in May 2015 "to
resolve a lawsuit alleging that PharMerica violated the CSA by dispensing
Schedule II controlled drugs without a valid prescription" and the FCA by
submitting false claims to Medicare for improperly dispensed drugs.1 9 4 As
background, "PharMerica is a long-term care pharmacy that dispenses
medications to residents of long-term care facilities, including nursing
homes and skilled nursing facilities."1 9 5 Many of the prescriptions filled
by PharMerica, including oxycodone and fentanyl, were for controlled
substances listed in Schedule II under the CSA.1 9 6 In terms of the CSA
allegations, the Government alleged that PharMerica pharmacies located
across the nation frequently dispensed oxycodone, fentanyl, and other
192. Idat53,¶272.
193. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B) (2012) (creating liability for "any person who...
knowingly ... causes to be presented ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" or
"knowingly ... causes to be made ... a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent
claim.") (emphasis added).
194. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Long-Term Care Pharmacy to
Pay $31.5 Million to Settle Lawsuit Alleging Violations of Controlled Substances Act and False
Claims Act (May 14, 2015), https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/long-term-care-pharmacy-pay-315-
million-settle-lawsuit-alleging-violations-controlled [https://perma.cc/3KLJ-XJBN] [hereinafter
PharMerica Press Release].
195. Id.
196. Id.
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Schedule II controlled drugs without a CSA-required physician
prescription. 97 instead, nursing home staff would order opioids and other
controlled drugs for residents and PharMerica pharmacists would dispense
the staff-ordered drugs without a physician's prescription.'9 8 PharMerica
agreed to pay $8 million to resolve the Government's CSA allegations.' 99
In terms of the FCA allegations, the Government alleged that
PharMerica knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare Part D-the
part of Medicare that provides a prescription drug benefit-for the same
improperly dispensed Schedule II drugs.200 PharMerica agreed to pay
$23.5 million to resolve the Government's FCA allegations. 2 0' The FCA
allegations were initially raised by relator Jennifer Denk, a pharmacist
formerly employed by PharMerica, under the FCA's qui tam provisions. 20 2
Ms. Denk received $4.3 million for her qui tam work on the case.2 03
The consolidated qui tam actions against Insys contain numerous other
legally false claims allegations. For example, the qui tam relators (and
now the Government in intervention) allege that Insys violated the FCA
by violating the Anti-Kickback Statute by offering or paying remuneration
to prescribers in return for writing Subsys prescriptions. 204 As discussed
in Part I, President Obama's Affordable Care Act amended the Anti-
Kickback Statute in 2010 to state that, "a claim that includes items or
services resulting from a violation of [the Anti-Kickback Statute]
constitutes a false or fraudulent claim for purposes of [the False Claims
Act]."205 By further example, the qui tam relators (and now the
Government in intervention) allege that Insys violated the FCA by
marketing and promoting Subsys for off-label uses. 206 In particular, the
plaintiffs argue that Insys' promotional activities influenced prescribers to
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Complaint, United States ex rel. Denk v. PharMerica Corp., No. 2:09-cv-720 (E.D. Wis.
July 23, 2009).
203. See PharMerica Press Release, supra note 194.
204. See Guzman Second Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 52, ¶ 268.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2012). See also United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone
Med. Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 394-95 (1st Cir. 2011) ("If kickbacks affected the transaction underlying a
claim ... the claim failed to meet a condition of payment .... We find... that the kickbacks were
capable of influencing Medicare's decision as to whether to pay the hospital and physician claims.").
206. See Guzman Second Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 34-42 (referencing cases in
which Insys instructed its sales representatives regarding off-label uses of Subsys and targeted
physicians who were neither oncologists nor pain specialists when the FDA had approved Subsys only
for cancer-related pain).
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prescribe Subsys for non-cancer-pain uses not covered by federal health
care programs, which "caused" the claims ultimately submitted by those
prescribers to be false in violation of the FCA.207
3. Qui Tam Actions Barred in Cases Involving Prior Public Disclosure
Remember that, unless a qui tam action is brought by the Attorney
General or the person bringing the action is an original source of
information, a court has the authority under the FCA to dismiss a qui tam
action if "substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in
the action or claim" have already been publicly disclosed by the news
media, through a hearing in which the Government is a party, or in a
federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation. 208  These dismissal
provisions may soon be applied to a qui tam opioid case. In United States
ex rel Manchester v. Purdue Pharma et al., relator Robert Manchester
filed a qui tam action against a number of defendants, including Purdue
Pharma, McKesson Corporation, Cardinal Health, and
AmerisourceBergen Corporation.209 In his complaint, Manchester alleged
that Purdue failed to tell the FDA about an abuse-deterrent formulation of
OxyContin.2 10 On August 22, 2018, the United States filed a motion
arguing that the case should be dismissed, reasoning that Manchester
based his allegations against the defendants "only on publicly available
information. "211 In its motion, the United States specified that both news
media and federal reports raised the issue of alleged marketing to
overprescribing physicians before Manchester filed his action, making
Manchester's case worthy of dismissal under the terms of the FCA.212
207. Id. at 56-57, ¶¶ 280-81.
208. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2012) (barring certain qui tam actions, including those in which the
allegations or transactions have already been publicly disclosed).
209. Third Amended Complaint and Demand for Trial by Jury, United States ex rel. Robert E.
Manchester et al. v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al., Case No. 1:16-cv-10947-MLW (D. Mass. Aug. 23,
2018).
210. Id.
211. Memorandum of Law in Support of the United States' Motion to Dismiss Relator's
Complaint, United States ex rel. Manchester et al. v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al., Case No. 1:16-cv-
10947-MLW (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2018).
212. See Daniel Seiden, DOJ Believes Opioid Case Will Fail Against Big Pharma Firms,
BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 24, 2018, 2:21 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XA44
D4PG000000?bna newsfilter-federal-contracting&jcsearch=BNA%2520000001656cObdc20al6d7
f6fa8250002#jcite [https://perma.cc/BU3R-D4JD] (discussing the public's prior knowledge of the
allegations made in the Manchester qui tam action).
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND NEW INITIATIVES
This Article has identified and discussed several opioid cases that
involve the federal Anti-Kickback Statute and the federal civil False
Claims Act. What effect have these two statutes had on the opioid crisis
as a whole? Starting with the Anti-Kickback Statute, the federal
Government clearly is using this legal tool in an attempt to cut off opioid
over-prescribing and/or testing over-referring induced by remuneration.
The prescribing physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants
discussed in Part I of this Article had been receiving millions of dollars of
remuneration in return for their frequent opioid prescriptions, referrals of
patients for drug testing services, and referrals of patients for opioid
addiction treatment services. Remember Dr. Johnson, who had entered
into a joint venture with William Hughes, the owner of Universal Oral
Fluids Lab (UOFL), pursuant to which Dr. Johnson referred all of his
patients, including his Medicare and Medicaid patients, to UOFL for drug
testing and related services?2 13 In that case, UOFL received approximately
$3,443,528 from Medicare and $1,147,768 from Pennsylvania Medicaid
based on Dr. Johnson's referrals alone.2 14  In addition, Dr. Johnson
received more than $2,300,000 in kickbacks from UOFL between May
2011 and November 2013.215 And, this is just one opioid case involving
one referring physician and one referred-to entity. From this perspective,
the Anti-Kickback Statute can be seen as an effective tool for combating
opioid-related health care fraud, abuse, and waste and for protecting
patients in cases in which a prescriber's medical judgment has been
compromised by illegal remuneration.
That said, note how many of these cases discussed in Part I of this
Article involved the opioid Subsys, manufactured by Insys. In terms of
the prescription portion of the opioid crisis, which is just one portion of
the overall opioid crisis,2 16 Subsys is an exceptionally "small [opioid]
fish."2 17 In particular, fewer than 0.02% of the 52 million opioid patients
213. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, W. Dist. of Pa., Physician
Sentenced to 7 Years in Prison for Accepting Kickbacks and Failing to Remit Employment Taxes
(June 30,2017), https://wwwjustice.gov/usao-wdpa/pr/physician-sentenced-7-years-prison-accepting
-kickbacks-and-failing-remit-employment [https://perma.cc/MU87-9N4J].
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See generally Oliva, supra note 8 (arguing that the prescription portion of the opioid crisis
is just one small part of the overall opioid crisis, which also includes illicit drugs).
217. Jill Riepenhoff, Some Get Rich as Opioid Addicts Suffer, DAILY INDEP. (Mar. 2, 2018),
https://www.dailyindependent.com/news/some-get-rich-as-opioid-addicts-suffer/article 712e2234-
Idbc- 1e8-8332-d7d5bl 157a0b.html [https://perma.cc/U7MB-ZGVQ?type-image].
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were prescribed Subsys in the year 2015, which many view as the peak of
opioid prescribing in the United States.2 18 Stepping back even further,
Insys is not even among the top fifty pharmaceutical companies in terms
of payments to opioid prescribers, and most of Insys's top payees are, to
this day, still practicing medicine or nursing and are still serving as
physician assistants.21 9 Although Insys certainly ranks high in terms of its
aggressive opioid marketing practices and its bold remuneration schemes,
which explains why they are an easy governmental target, the
Government's take-down of key Insys payors and top Subsys prescribers
is relatively insignificant when viewed from the perspective of the entire
opioid manufacturing industry.
The Anti-Kickback Statute thus may be viewed as an effective tool for
purposes of dealing with individual bad actors, like Drs. Couch and Ruan,
whose opioid prescriptions were fueled by remuneration and greed.
However, the Anti-Kickback Statute is also a relatively small tool in terms
of combating the overall opioid crisis. Remember that although the opioid
crisis is frequently framed as a prescription drug epidemic primarily
attributable to the over-prescription of opioids, illicit (non-prescription)
drugs also play a very large role in the crisis220 and opioid prescribing has
been on the decline since 2016.221 Also remember that Congress enacted
the Anti-Kickback Statute based on the concern that health care kickbacks
can lead to corruption of medical decision making; patient steering;
overutilization of health care items, services, and supplies; increased costs
to federal health care programs; and unfair competition.2 22 The Anti-
Kickback Statute was simply not designed to address, and does not
address, the many other behavioral, sociocultural, socioeconomic, and
criminal justice factors that are believed to contribute to the opioid
crisis.2 2 3
For example, in terms of behavioral factors that contribute to the
opioid crisis, some physicians overprescribe opioids even though they do
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See generally Oliva, supra note 8 (making this argument).
221. See, e.g., Pat Anson, Significant Decline in U.S. Opioid Prescribing, PAIN NEWS NETWORK
(Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.painnewsnetwork.org/stories/2016/4/15/significant-decline-in-us-
opioid-prescribing [https://perma.cc/5KVZ-BKDK] (referencing a report finding that the opioid crisis
is "increasingly being fueled by illegal opioids such as heroin and illicit fentanyl, not by prescription
pain medication intended for patients" and that hydrocodone prescription is on the decline).
222. Roadmap for New Physicians, supra note 33.
223. See, e.g., Nat'l Inst. of Health, Executive Summary - Contributions ofSocial andBehavioral
Research in Addressing the Opioid Crisis (Mar. 6, 2018) [hereinafter NIH Study],
https://www.nih.gov/heal-initiative/executive-summary-contributions-social-behavioral-research-
addressing-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/EZR5-H2DB].
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not receive remuneration for those prescriptions. That is, some physicians
simply overprescribe-either because they were taught to prescribe in that
manner or because they developed their own over-prescribing
behaviors.224 By further example, in terms of sociocultural and
socioeconomic factors that contribute to the opioid crisis, one line of
research views opioid addiction as a symptom of an economic and social
despair that is both: (1) markedly higher among those without a college
degree; and (2) one result of a long process that has eroded working-class
life in the United States and that has led to an increase in pain-related
complaints.22 5 A second line of research shows that the criminal justice
system is ill-equipped to address the opioid crisis, and that criminalization
of illicit drug use has the unintended effect of increasing stigma and
decreasing access to treatments by individuals with opioid use disorder. 226
In summary, the opioid crisis has multiple contributing factors, most of
which cannot be addressed by the Anti-Kickback Statute.
In terms of the behavior that the Anti-Kickback Statute (and the False
Claims Act) are designed to address, it must be noted that these statutes
are limited in their application to federal (versus private) health care
program business. The Anti-Kickback Statute thus does not apply to a
patient recruiter who offers or pays remuneration in return for private
health insurance business, or a prescriber who solicits or receives
remuneration in return for writing opioid prescriptions or referring patients
for drug testing or addiction treatment services that are reimbursed by
private health insurance. The same is true of a prescriber who submits a
false claim to a private insurer or who makes a false statement that is
material to a claim submitted to a private insurer. That said, other federal
laws,227 including the new Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of
2018,228 as well as many state laws 229 do apply in the context of private
health insurance.
What about the effectiveness of the False Claims Act in terms of
224. See, e.g., Marty Makary, How Doctors Can Stop the Opioid Crisis at Its Source: Quit
Overprescribing, USA TODAY, (Aug. 4, 2017, 3:15 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/opinion/2017/08/04/doctors-stop-opioid-crisis-quit-overprescribing-marty-makary-column/504
860001/ [https://perma.cc/2STX-WKS8] (quoting aphysician who stated that, for most of his surgical
career, he gave out opioids "like candy").
225. See NIH Study, supra note 223, at 5.
226. Id.
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a) (2012); see also Support for Patients and Communities Act, Pub.
L. No. 115-271, §§ 8121-8122, 132 Stat. 3894 (2018) (two federal health care fraud and abuse laws
that apply in the context of private health insurance).
228. See infra notes 235-42 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Peter E. Kalb, Health Care Fraud and Abuse, 282 JAMA 1163 (Sept. 22, 1999)
(discussing state health care fraud and abuse laws).
2019 935
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
combating the opioid crisis? As discussed in Part II of this Article, some
factually false claims, including claims for services never provided,
certainly can increase unnecessary costs to federal health care programs.
However, these factually false claims do not contribute to the patient
injury (or addiction) side of the opioid crisis because opioids were never
dispensed to any live patients. Other factually false statements, including
diagnoses that are falsified to ensure reimbursement, can contribute to the
patient injury side of the opioid crisis, however. For example, when a non-
cancer patient receives an opioid approved by the FDA only for patients
with cancer-related pain due to a falsified diagnostic statement, the patient
may be unnecessarily exposed to a highly addictive drug and life-
threatening respiratory depression as a result.
Because the False Claims Act targets so many different types of
conduct, including factually false and legally false claims, as well as
expressly false and impliedly false certifications, the False Claims Act is
viewed as an important tool in terms of combating the opioid crisis. 2 30 One
follow-up issue, though, is whether the Government has sufficient
resources to investigate all of the behavior that potentially violates the
False Claims Act in the context of opioids. On one hand, the DOJ
announced in February 2018 the creation of its Prescription Interdiction &
Litigation (PIL) Task Force, specifically designed to fight the prescription
opioid crisis. 23 ' According to the DOJ's press release on the topic, the PIL
Task Force will "aggressively deploy and coordinate all available criminal
and civil law enforcement tools to reverse the tide of opioid overdoses in
the United States, with a particular focus on opioid manufacturers and
distributors."232 The press release specifically announces that the DOJ will
use the False Claims Act in its fight against the opioid crisis:
The PIL Task Force will use criminal and civil actions to ensure that
distributors and pharmacies are obeying [DEA] rules designed to prevent
diversion and improper prescribing. It will use the False Claims Act and
230. See, e.g., Nekia Hackworth Jones, The DOJ's Latest Opioid Crime-Fighting Tool: The Civil
False Claims Act, L.J. NEWSLETTER (July 2018), http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/
2018/07/01/the-dojs-latest-opioid-crime-fighting-tool-the-civil-false-claims-act/ [https://perma.cc/
Q5BS-EP7U] (stating "[t]he U.S. Department of Justice is now using the False Claims Act-
traditionally a civil enforcement tool-to combat the United States' sweeping opioid epidemic", and
"[t]he use of the FCA is part of a larger DOJ strategy to develop multi-faceted solutions for this public
health emergency.").
231. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General Sessions
Announces New Prescription Interdiction & Litigation Task Force (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announces-new-prescription-interdiction-
litigation-task-force [https://perma.cc/UQM2-UWKW].
232. Id.
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other tools to crack down on pain-management clinics, drug testing
facilities, and physicians that make opioid prescriptions. 233
Whether governmental funding is sufficient to support the important
activities of the PIL Task Force remains to be seen, although recent reports
suggest that the enforcement of the FCA in opioid cases continues to
increase.234
The federal government has other new initiatives relevant to opioid
fraud and abuse, and the implementation and enforcement of these new
initiatives remains to be seen as well. On October 24, 2018, President
Trump signed into law the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act
(SUPPORT Act), a comprehensive piece of legislation designed to combat
the opioid crisis. 235 The SUPPORT Act appropriates millions of dollars
from the Treasury and the federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust
Fund to support a variety of federal agencies in the creation and/or
execution of new research studies, reports, demonstration projects,
programs, guidelines, and enforcement efforts designed to combat the
opioid crisis.236 One part of the SUPPORT Act establishes the Eliminating
Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018 (EKRA).237 EKRA builds on the
prohibitions set forth in the federal Anti-Kickback Statute by making
illegal the knowing and willful solicitation or receipt, or offer or payment,
of remuneration, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind, in return for the referral of a patient or patronage to a recovery home,
clinical treatment facility, or laboratory or to induce a referral of an
individual to a recovery home, clinical treatment facility, or laboratory. 238
EKRA defines recovery home as a shared living environment that is, or
purports to be, free from alcohol and illicit drug use and centered on peer
support and connection to services that promotes sustained recovery from
substance use disorders. 239  EKRA further defines clinical treatment
233. Id.
234. See James Swann, Fraudulent Opioid Prescribers Can Expect More Federal Charges,
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.bna.com/fraudulent-opioid-prescribers-
n57982095984/ [https://perma.cc/7UQ4-4SHX] (reporting that "'[t]otal FCA filings in cases
involving opioid fraud among prescribers, drug companies, and addiction treatment centers also
increased in [fiscal year] 2018 compared to previous years"', and that "'[p]roviders prescribing and
distributing opioids are on notice that their actions will be watched closely, and it's essential that they
remain up to date on current laws, monitor prescribing practices, and report any diversion promptly').
235. See Support for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 7031, 132 Stat. 3894
(2018).
236. Id.
237. Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-271, §§ 8121-8122
(2018).
238. Id.
239. Id.
2019 937
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
facility as a medical setting, other than a hospital, that provides
detoxification, risk reduction, outpatient treatment and care, residential
treatment, or rehabilitation for substance use, pursuant to licensure or
certification under State law.240
Although some behaviors prohibited by EKRA are technically already
prohibited by the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, EKRA applies to
remuneration exchanged for both public and private health care program
business. 2 4' As such, EKRA builds on the federal Anti-Kickback Statute
by prohibiting the exchange of remuneration for referrals for private-
health-insurance-reimbursed recovery home services, clinical treatment
services, and laboratory services. (EKRA, like the Anti-Kickback Statute,
would not apply to the referral of these services when paid for by cash or
credit card.) In a recent press release, the DOJ explained why EKRA was
needed: "[P]atients in substance abuse treatment facilities are not usually
typical Medicare beneficiaries, but are often people on private insurance
or even people in their early [twenties] still on their parents' insurance.
'These patients are really treated as cash registers ... ."'242 EKRA
establishes criminal penalties of not more than $200,000, imprisonment of
not more than ten years, or both, for each violation of EKRA.243 EKRA
further provides that it does not supersede or preempt other applicable
federal or state laws, including the federal Anti-Kickback Statute. 24 4
In addition to the PIL Task Force and EKRA, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) also recently created a mega anti-fraud
program, called the Unified Program Integrity Contractor (UPIC), in an
attempt to improve health care fraud and abuse economies of scale and
address state-specific fraud and abuse issues. 245 In particular, UPIC will
be responsible for health care fraud and abuse data mining, investigations,
law enforcement referrals, claims auditing, provider education, and other
fraud and abuse prevention activities.246 CMS designed UPIC with the
goal of bridging and improving health care fraud and abuse
communications between and among the federal Medicare Program and
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Matt Phifer, Justice Dept. Aims to Thwart Substance Abuse Treatment Fraud, BLOOMBERG
L. (Nov. 5, 2018, 10:54 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/justice-dept-
aims-to-thwart-substance-abuse-treatment-fraud [https://perma.cc/GP2E-FSMQ].
243. Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018 §§ 8121-8122.
244. Id.
245. James Swann, Medicare Herds Four Anti-Fraud Programs Under One Roof BLOOMBERG
L. (Nov. 8, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/medicare-
herds-four-anti-fraud-programs-under-one-roof [https://perma.cc/46ZN-539X].
246. Id.
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state Medicaid Programs.247 According to CMS, UPIC will be capable of
detecting health care providers who, for example, commit Medicare fraud
and abuse and then relocate to a new state and attempt to repeat the
fraudulent activity in connection with the new state's Medicaid
Program.24 8
Between the new PIL Task Force, EKRA, and UPIC, the federal
government's health care fraud and abuse detection, investigation, and
enforcement efforts appear to be at an all-time high. Hopefully, these new
initiatives will assist in the detection and prevention of opioid fraud and
abuse as well.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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